Wednesday, August 20, 2014

Again, an Auditing Firm Fails to Serve the Public Interest

Again, we’re confronted with a CPA firm that has harmed the auditing profession. 

This time, PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) was doing a consulting assignment for the Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi (BTMU). The New York State Department of Financial Services investigated the assignment and concluded, "PwC – under pressure from BTMU executives – improperly altered an historical transaction review" (HTR) report submitted to regulators on wire transfers that the Bank performed on behalf of sanctioned countries and entities."

The purpose of the engagement was to ensure that transactions with Iran and other countries under United States sanctions were properly handled:

“[PwC] conducted a Historical Transaction Review ("HTR" ) for BTMU. The HTR analyzed BTMU 's U.S. dollar clearing activity between April 1, 2006 and March 31, 2007. Its purpose was to: ( I) identify any U.S. dollar transactions that potentially should have been frozen, blocked or reported under applicable OFAC [Office of Foreign Asset Control] requirements; and (2) investigate the relevant transaction set for compliance with OFAC requirements.”

PwC claims it did this consulting assignment under Statement on Standards for Consulting Services No. 1 issued by the AICPA. Those standards say the consulting firm should:

“Serve the client interest by seeking to accomplish the objectives established by the understanding with the client while maintaining integrity and objectivity.

In addition, Article III of the Code of Professional Conduct describes integrity as follows: 

"Integrity requires a member to be, among other things, honest and candid within the constraints of client confidentiality. Service and the public trust should not be subordinated to personal gain and advantage. Integrity can accommodate the inadvertent error and the honest difference of opinion; it cannot accommodate deceit or subordination of principle." 


Unfortunately, PwC allowed the client bank to edit its report and as a result, significant changes occurred between the original draft and the final report.

Originally, the report said:

“While we agree in theory, had PwC know [sic] about these "[deleted Special]Written Operational Instructions" at the initial Phase of the HTR then we would have used a different approach for completing this project.”

The final report, after suggested edits from the bank, said:
                                 
“We have concluded that the written instructions would not have impacted the completeness of data available for the HTR and our methodology to process and search the HTR data was appropriate.”

In an initial draft of the report, PwC included paragraphs from a bank manual outlining “special instructions” employees should follow to ensure that transactions with countries under United States sanctions did not draw attention. PwC deleted those paragraphs in the version of the report sent to regulators, again based on suggested edits from the bank.

From at least 2002 to 2007, BTMU had unlawfully cleared through the Bank' s New York State licensed branch about 28,000 payments, valued at about $100 billion. These improper payments involved Iran, Sudan, Myanmar, and other entities under US sanctions

So as the United States fights terrorist states around the world, PwC does nothing to help our nation while it harms its reputation and the auditing profession.

I wonder what kind of action the accounting profession will take against the PwC employees who failed to follow the Consulting Standards and the Code of Professional Conduct? (See http://davehancox.blogspot.com/2014/08/illinois-takes-no-action-against.html- taking no action by our profession is all too common – even on big publicity events)


The New York State Department of Financial Services fined PwC $25 million and has suspended the firm for 24 months from accepting consulting engagements at financial institutions regulated by the Department of Financial Services.

Here is an example of the edits suggested by the bank - there were several iterations of these edits.





Monday, August 4, 2014

Illinois Takes No Action Against Auditors Found Culpable in Dixon, Illinois Fraud

Prior blogs on this topic:

The city of Dixon, Illinois announced on September 25, 2013 it would receive a $40 million settlement from CliftonLarsonAllen, Fifth Third Bank, and Janis Card and Associates for the fraud Rita Crundwell committed and was not detected by the CPA firms or the bank.

I followed up with the Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulation to determine if the Department had considered investigating or had taken disciplinary action against the Certified Public Accountants involved in the audits of Dixon, Illinois.

According to the Department's web page:

“The Department’s mission is to protect and promote the lives of Illinois consumers.

We regulate most of the professionals and financial institutions that Illinois families depend on everyday - from banks to veterinarians and almost everything in between. We also work with the licensed professionals, members of the General Assembly, law enforcement officers, consumer groups and concerned public citizens to make sure that unscrupulous businesses and incompetent professionals can't take advantage of their customers and clients.”

According to the Department’s web site, no disciplinary action has been taken against any of the major participants in the Dixon, Illinois audits.

In responding to my Freedom of Information Request, they simply said, “Pursuant to the Act [Illinois Freedom of Information Act], your request does not seek to produce a particular public record.”

Two of the people I inquired about have active licenses, one has an inactive license and one has not renewed his license.

Interestingly, Ronald J. Blaine, one of the partners doing the audits was previously disciplined on February 28, 2000. The reason for the disciplinary action: “[Mr. Blaine] [a]llegedly authorized the issuance of an unqualified opinion on financial statements that may have failed to fully disclose the financial conditions of one company.”

That sounds very similar to what occurred in Dixon, Illinois. The Department though would not tell me the name of the company the partner was auditing for which he was reprimanded.

Another partner, while not disciplined, has allowed his CPA license to become “inactive.” A search on the Internet though shows he continues to use the CPA designation. Here’s one of his web sites:

“For tax preparation in Sterling, Illinois, you can count on Samuel S. Card, CPA at Samuel S. Card, CPA P.C. Samuel S. Card, CPA assists taxpayers and small businesses with taxes in Sterling, Illinois and the surrounding communities. Whether you are an individual or a local business in or around Sterling, Illinois, Samuel S. Card, CPA has years of valuable experience as an IRS registered tax preparer.

Contact Samuel S. Card, CPA, tax filing specialist in Sterling, Illinois, for help with your taxes.”

I called Mr. Card’s office to see if he was still working. A woman answered the phone. When I questioned her if Mr. Card was practicing as a CPA, she indicated he was not. She said he was working as an accountant.

I’m not sure how the Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulation can, “make sure that unscrupulous businesses and incompetent professionals can't take advantage of their customers and clients” if there is no “particular public record” available about an investigation into this incredible failure to find a $53 million fraud that occurred over a 22-year period.

Tuesday, June 10, 2014

Veterans Health Administration Audit Should Be Taken with a Grain of Salt

Here is a copy of the Department of Veteran Affairs audit on its system wide review of access to care. https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/79212257/vaaccessauditfindingsreport.pdf

Unfortunately, this audit has such significant deficiencies it does not meet Government Auditing Standards or the Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing. It should not have been put forth as an audit.

This report is garnering significant media attention, but it has severe limitations. These include:

  • Design of the survey which was intended to provide a very low threshold (i.e., high sensitivity) for eliciting potentially improper scheduling practices.
    • VA intentionally designed the survey to be sensitive to non-conforming scheduling policies. As such, the results will group misunderstanding of proper scheduling methodology together with intentional instruction to report alternate waiting times. The sensitivity in the instrument enables VA to identify a broader set of sites with potentially problematic practices.
  • The Audit Survey tool itself did not undergo pre-testing to ensure all respondents would understand the intent of each item.
    • Certain items on the questionnaire may have been misunderstood.
  • Individual questions were not worded to ascertain the reason that policy may have been violated.
    • Therefore, findings from this audit cannot be extended to identify deliberate deception, fraud, or malfeasance.
  • The scope of the audit precluded independent verification of any narrative statements, though all data collected throughout the Access Audit have been shared with VA’s OIG.
    • Furthermore, the audit did identify sites necessitating more intensive management investigations. VHA will ensure that accountability for inappropriate practices is pursued through further investigations to substantiate initial findings. In pursuing accountability, VHA will follow statutory and regulatory due process requirements accorded to all Federal government employees.
  • Site audit teams had limited time (90 minutes of pre-survey coaching plus additional document review) for training.
    • While site teams were generally knowledgeable about audits, investigations, and consultative visits, not all were experts in all the complexities associated with scheduling and access management.
  • Sampling of staff was based on availability.
    • Staff selected for interviews may not have been available to complete the requested interview. In these cases, the site audit team selected another candidate.
  • Treatment of respondents prior to interview
    • In certain instances staff selected for interviews had experienced recent training (e.g., within days of the requested interview). This treatment may have altered results, affecting baseline assessments of understanding of scheduling policies and practices.
  • Limited validation of responses
    • Survey science includes methodology for internal validation to ensure consistency of responses. This is limited in the audit and where included does not support a high correlation (see 5.1 of this audit results for details).

Employees indicated reluctance to participate in the survey that was used to draw conclusions "...due to fear they would be subject to disciplinary action due to deviation from national policy."

The report alleges some very significant findings, but does not pin-point who is causing the problem. A good audit would have identified the root cause of the problem. I'd like to know who placed pressure on the schedulers as cited in the following section of the report:

  • "Findings indicate that in some cases, pressures were placed on schedulers to utilize inappropriate practices in order to make waiting times (based on desired date, and the waiting lists), appear more favorable. Such practices are sufficiently pervasive to require VA re-examine its entire performance management system and, in particular, whether current measures and targets for access are realistic or sufficient." 
  • "Respondents at 90 clinic sites provided responses indicating they had altered desired dates that had been entered. In virtually all cases, they indicated they were instructed by supervisors, but many believed the policy of altering dates was coming from facility leadership. In at least 2 clinics, respondents believed someone else (not a scheduler) was routinely accessing records and changing desired dates in order to improve performance measures."

In addition, the recommendation to re-examine the performance management system is only part of the problem if the real issue is management lacking in integrity. Audits that leave the reader to wonder who is the cause of the problem identified do a real disservice to the good people in the organization being audited. It taints everyone. 

I know this report was issued to meet the demand for accountability, but it should not have been issued under the guise of an audit. It should have been issued as a report on the results of a survey. 

Interestingly, I can't even determine who is responsible for the report other than the Veteran's Health Administration. It's an unsigned report.



Sunday, May 18, 2014

Saturday, April 26, 2014

US Senate Committee finds DHS Acting Inspector General Lacked Independence

The following story is one I’ve heard from other government auditors over many years. Senior staff without the knowledge or skill to do audit related work creating a negative environment that results in watered-down audit reports.

When I encourage staff to speak out, the common refrain is, “I can’t afford to lose my job.” – which is understandable.

It is good to see, in the following instance, that some brave staff did stand up, testified before the US Senate, to bring about change in the senior ranks of an important agency.

LACK OF INDEPENDENCE

The United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs found that Mr. Charles Edwards, the Acting Inspector General of the Department of Homeland Security, jeopardized the independence of that Office. The Committee found, "Mr. Edwards did not understand the importance of independence. [He] communicated frequently with DHS senior officials and considered them personal friends. Mr. Edwards did not obtain independent legal advice. [He] directed reports to be altered or delayed to accommodate senior DHS officials. Mr. Edwards did not recuse himself from some audits and inspections that had a conflict of interest related to his wife’s employment, resulting in those reports being tainted."

What a damning indictment. Based on this report, Mr. Edwards resigned from his position at the OIG and requested and received a transfer to the Office of Science and Technology at DHS.

It is inconceivable to me that he continues to work at the same agency especially after the Committee found, “…that Mr. Edwards asked and received assistance from an employee who worked on his Ph.D. dissertation.”

In addition, “…the Subcommittee did find that there was a widespread belief that Mr. Edwards engaged in those actions and that belief contributed to an office environment characterized by low morale, fear, and general dissatisfaction with Mr. Edwards’ leadership.”

Here are some of the findings from the Senate Committee report.

Lack of Familiarity with OIG Work

Unlike most IGs, Mr. Edwards does not have experience conducting audits, investigations, or inspections, the three main types of work conducted in an Office of Inspector General. For example, when interviewed by Subcommittee staff, Edwards was unable to articulate guidelines that govern briefing details of an ongoing investigation to DHS. Edwards stated, “I don’t know that offhand here.”

Frequent Communications and Personal Relationships with Senior DHS Officials

Mr. Edwards frequently communicated with both the DHS Chief of Staff and the DHS Acting Counsel. In many of these e-mails, Mr. Edwards offered updates on investigations and audits. Mr. Edwards did not include senior members of his staff on many of these emails and they were not aware of these communications. One senior OIG official called the exclusion of involved staff in these e-mail chains “concerning.”

Edwards socialized with senior DHS officials outside of work over drinks and dinner. 

The Subcommittee obtained e-mails where Mr. Edwards told the DHS Chief of Staff that he truly valued his friendship and that his “support, guidance and friendship has helped me be successful this year”. The Subcommittee also obtained an e-mail to the DHS Acting Counsel where Mr. Edwards wrote “Your friendship, support and advice means so much to me. There are many blessings to be thankful for this year, but one of the best is having a friend like you.”

Lack of Independent Legal Advice

By law, an IG can only obtain legal advice from his own or another IG’s counsel. This restriction recognizes that legal advice from an agency’s General Counsel compromises the independence of the OIG.

The Counsel to the IG stated he was “cut out of some of the major decision-making.” He also informed the Subcommittee that he was not given access to Mr. Edwards’ calendar and his direct reporting relationship with Mr. Edwards ended.

Four former OIG officials told the Subcommittee that Mr. Edwards would go to the DHS Office of General Counsel for advice. The Subcommittee also reviewed an e-mail from Mr. Edwards to the DHS Acting Counsel which appears to contain a request for legal assistance, stating: “I really need some legal help….Please help me for the next four months.”

Improper Alteration or Delay of Reports

There are numerous reports discussed in this section, I would encourage the reader of this blog to read the Committee full report to see what occurred, but here is one part, “OIG officials told the Subcommittee that Mr. Edwards did not consult with his Assistant IG (AIG) for Audits or the Counsel to the IG prior to making this change. According to the Counsel to the IG, this was “entirely inappropriate.” Moreover, the changes were made after the final draft was given to DHS, which was “inappropriate,” and “irregular.”

Tainted Audit Reports

The Subcommittee received allegations that OIG audit reports were tainted due to a conflict of interest presented by the employment of Mr. Edwards’ wife in the Program Accountability and Risk Management office of DHS.

Because of the appearance of a conflict of interest, the OIG had to temporarily remove four audit and two inspection reports from its website and amend them to include a modified independence statement.

ABUSE OF AGENCY RESOURCES

Assistance with Pursuit of a Ph.D.

The Subcommittee determined that Mr. Edwards abused agency resources by asking a staff member to work on his Ph.D. dissertation.

Mr. Edwards’ Acting Chief of Staff provided assistance to Mr. Edwards with his dissertation over a period of at least eight months, from September 2011 to April 2012. During this period, the Acting Chief of Staff said she worked on the dissertation at work and at home, both during and after business hours. This work included research, editing, and proofreading. In total, the Acting Chief of Staff estimated that she spent approximately 20-25 hours assisting Mr. Edwards with his dissertation. The Subcommittee was unable to verify the accuracy of this estimate. The Acting Chief of Staff was allowed to telework while working on Mr. Edwards’ dissertation. Mr. Edwards also appeared to offer to delegate the Acting Chief of Staff’s official duties to other OIG employees to allow her to focus on his dissertation.

Assistance with Employment at Capitol College

The Subcommittee identified at least 15 occasions between September 2011 and March 2012 in which Mr. Edwards asked for or received assistance from a member of the OIG’s technology staff. On one occasion, Mr. Edwards sent the employee a 96 slide PowerPoint presentation and asked her to “do the notes for each slide.” The employee also assisted Mr. Edwards in drafting guidance documents for student assignments and on substantive matters for class tests. This assistance was provided during both official and non-official hours.

Office Environment

During the Subcommittee’s investigation, current and former OIG employees repeatedly reported that Mr. Edwards had created a hostile work environment. One official characterized the office as a “toxic, totally dysfunctional and oppressive” work environment characterized by low morale, paranoia, and fear. Another official described the atmosphere of the OIG as one of “[c]omplete terror,” such that “there were times that [they] couldn’t even get up out of bed, [they were] so emotionally scared, drained.”

Many employees told the Subcommittee they wanted a change in leadership. According to one official, the OIG staff “want to have a legitimate Inspector General in place to get us back on track.” Another called the office “the worst agency” and said that it has been “run into the ground” under Mr. Edwards’ leadership. Reasons include Mr. Edwards’ reluctance to “seek out advice or guidance from anybody with experience” and that the “people … he surrounds himself with … do not have the background or the experience to be useful to him.”

According to one OIG employee, more experienced senior officials refrained from criticizing Mr. Edwards out of fear of repercussions. The Subcommittee was told that “[Mr. Edwards] has a very limited idea of loyalty and people whom he can trust, and if you ever disagree with him, he no longer trusts you.”190 The result, according to multiple OIG officials, has been a steady exodus of agency staff. 191 One OIG official told the Subcommittee that Mr. Edwards’ management style was “my way or the highway, and if you don’t like it, I will either put you on admin[istrative] leave or I’ll make sure that you leave.”

Conclusion

The US Senate Committee’s report was the result of allegations coming from whistle blowers. I hear of similar allegations in other agencies and I always tell staff to think through a strategy that can result in change. I encourage all government auditors to read this report and to see what is possible.

Sunday, April 13, 2014

Problem Audits are Worldwide

"Problem audits" aren't just a U.S. problem.
Big accounting firms are producing deficient audits around the world, according to a new survey of 30 countries' audit regulators—mirroring the experience in the U.S., where regulators have found deficiencies in more than a third of audits by major accounting firms that they have inspected in recent years.
This is from the Wall Street Journal's April 10, 2014 edition: 

Sunday, April 6, 2014

Livent creditors awarded $85-million due to auditors’ negligence

From the Globe and Mail

An Ontario judge has awarded $85-million in damages to the creditors of long-defunct theatre company Livent Inc., ruling the firm’s auditors at Deloitte & Touche were negligent in their reviews of the company’s 1997 financial statements.

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/livent-creditors-awarded-85-million-due-to-auditors-negligence/article17845004/