Friday, November 29, 2013

Officials Duped Out of $100 Million – Auditors Were No Help at Fletcher Asset Management


Three Louisiana pension funds invested a combined $100 million in 2008 in Fletcher Asset Management. Each of the three funds invested from 3.9 percent to 8.6 percent of their assets in Fletcher's scheme after the firm made a pitch promising to deliver every investor's dream: high returns with low risk.

In fact, the arrangement promised a guaranteed 12 percent return on their money. If the return dipped lower, the difference supposedly would be made up by $50 million put up by a third-party investor.

This week, the Trustee in Fletcher’s bankruptcy said the value of the assets in Fletcher were worth less than $8 million. Fletcher had valued the fund at $352 million.

It’s hard to have sympathy for public pension officials who are gullible enough to fall for a high guaranteed rate of return. The Municipal Employees' Retirement System of Louisiana actually had no policy on credit risk or interest rate risk – fundamental risks that should have been assessed before investing.

Despite this naïve approach to managing public funds, the pension officials should have been able to depend on the auditors to ferret out any wrong-doing on the part of Fletcher Asset Management. Unfortunately, the auditor team failed again to properly carry out its audit responsibilities and as such, failed to alert the public to the significant short-comings in Fletcher’s financial statements.

Based on the Trustee’s investigation, investors were victims of a fraud defined by:
  • the extensive use of wildly inflated valuations, 
  • the existence of fictitious assets under management, 
  • the improper payment of excessive fees, 
  • the misuse of investor money, 
  • and efforts wrongly to deny the Louisiana Pension Funds a key benefit of their investment agreement – mandatory redemption of their investment under certain circumstances.

The Funds were also victims of an environment where self-interest all too often trumped fiduciary obligations.[1]

The Trustee went on to say,

“Auditors, too, failed to exercise adequate professional skepticism when reviewing valuations; failed to insist on adequate disclosure of related party transactions involving [Alphonse Fletcher] and his family, Citco, and Unternaehrer; and failed to require disclosure of redemption obligations which would have caused a collapse of the Funds.”[2]

There were numerous red flags that ought to have been readily apparent to the administrators and auditors for the Funds. These red flags included: 
  • Manager-controlled pricing of customized investments, supported by a valuation agent lacking adequate experience and independence; 
  • Massive subscriptions into the Funds in November and December 2008 (following the collapse of Lehman Brothers) from the FAM-controlled Richcourt Funds, when both the administrator and auditor knew that the Richcourt Funds had suspended net asset values (“NAVs”) and redemptions and imposed gating on investors; 
  • Repeated massive sudden gains in multiple investment positions; 
  • Multiple transactions in major positions at values that were inconsistent with the mark-to-model valuations; 
  • Valuation reports that did not meet minimum industry standards; 
  • Guaranteed minimum investor returns for certain investors; 
  • Absence of any down months over 127 months from June 1997 through December 2007; 
  • Fund complexity; 
  • Lack of timely issuance of annual audited financial statements; 
  • Lack of timely reporting and communications to investors, including delays in receiving monthly and weekly financial data from the investment manager in order to calculate NAVs; Backdating corporate and transaction documents; 
  • Ascribing value to non-exercised contract rights to buy securities without actually investing in them; 
  • Mismatch between the terms of the investment vehicle and the underlying investments; and 
  • Continued inflows and outflow over short time periods from affiliates and related entities.

These red flags should have caused the administrators and auditors to have investigated, disclosed and stopped. None did.[3]

The Trustee identified a number of auditing standards that were not complied with by the auditors. The Trustee said,

“To arrive at their opinions and discharge their duties, Grant Thornton and Eisner were required to plan and perform their audits in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS). These standards prescribe the minimum threshold conduct for an auditor. The Trustee reviewed, among other evidence, the accountants’ work papers and deposition testimony, and concluded that the audits performed failed to comply with GAAS. Grant Thornton and Eisner failed to qualify their audit opinions appropriately to acknowledge that the financial statements were materially misstated and should not have been relied on by those receiving them. In this regard, it is important to remember that the audience for these audits was not only the Funds, but also the investors to whom the various audits were addressed.

Grant Thornton or Eisner (or both) violated the following GAAS:

• General Standard No. 1, which requires the auditor to “have adequate technical training and proficiency to perform the audit.”
• General Standard No. 2, which requires the auditor to “maintain independence in mental attitude in all matters relating to the audit.”
• General Standard No. 3, which requires the auditor to “exercise due professional care in the performance of the audit and the preparation of the report.”  Due professional care requires the auditor to exercise professional skepticism. Professional skepticism is an attitude that includes a questioning mind and a critical assessment of audit evidence.

• Standard of Field Work No. 3, which requires the auditor to “obtain appropriate audit evidence by performing audit procedures to afford a reasonable basis for an opinion regarding the financial statements.”
• Standard of Reporting No. 1, which requires the auditor to state whether the “financial statements are presented in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP).”
• Standards of Reporting No. 3, which requires that “when the auditor determines that the informative disclosures are inadequate, the auditor must state so in the auditor’s report.”

I’ll examine these in more detail in future blogs.



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[1] Page 4, Trustee’s Report and Disclosure Statement, Fletcher International, LTD., Issued 11/25/13, Case No. 12-12796 (REG). US Bankruptcy Court Southern District of New York
[2] Ibid. Page 8
[3] Ibid. Page 10

Friday, October 25, 2013

NY Times: Accounting World, Still Resisting Sunlight

Here is an interesting article in the New York Times. 

Floyd Norris reports, "The accounting business has sometimes had an attitude of — how shall I put it? — contempt for those who would regulate it. The people who run the major firms know best, and regulators should yield to their superior judgment."

http://nyti.ms/1d3hQrO

Sunday, October 20, 2013

Forged Documents – Get Two Out of Prison - Were Risks Assessed?

Two Florida inmates walked out of prison based on forged documents authorizing their early release from life sentences. This is an impressive prison escape and it shows the importance of an appropriate internal control system.
In a letter addressed to Florida's Circuit Court judges, Michael Crews, secretary of the Department of Corrections, writes the department would require verification of any future order from a sentencing judge that results in early release of an inmate.
The inmate will not be released until verification is received, Crews writes. "In light of the potential for fraudulent use of court papers, we believe that the additional step of providing verification of sentence modification court orders is an important safeguard in ensuring the integrity of the judicial process…"
The letter follows after the convicted murderers, Joseph Jenkins 


and Charles Walker


checked in as required by Florida law with a jail after they gained their freedom from the Franklin Correctional Institution in Carrabelle, Florida.
As I've written in previous blogs, forged documents are easy to produce. Clever individuals who understand the systems in place, and where weaknesses exist, can exploit that system.
While there will be legislative hearings on this case, based on my experience, it is likely the Department of Corrections did not formally assess the risk of this type of escape and design control systems to assure the risk was mitigated.

Here is one the forged document related to Joseph Jenkins release:




Friday, September 27, 2013

Auditors Settle Lawsuit in Dixon Illinois Fraud

The city of Dixon, Illinois announced on September 25, 2013 it would receive a $40 million settlement from CliftonLarsonAllen, Fifth Third Bank, and Janis Card and Associates for the fraud Rita Crundwell committed and was not detected by the CPA firms or the bank.

The city sued the CPA firms and bank after its Comptroller, Rita Crundwell, stole $53 million over 20 years. Bruce Devon of the Chicago firm Powers, Rogers & Smith developed a case that clearly showed the shortcomings in the audit process that allowed the fraud to go undetected until Ms. Crundwell took extended leave. At that time, another city employee discovered the bank account Ms. Crundwell used to steal from the city.

Of the $40 million settlement, $35.15 million was paid by Clifton, $3.85 million by Fifth Third Bank, and $1 million by Janis Card and Associates. In addition, federal marshals and the US Attorney's Office recovered about $10 million from the sale of assets owned by Ms. Crundwell who is serving 19 years, seven months in prison.

CliftonLarsonAllen LLP is one of the nation’s top 10 certified public accounting firms. Its CEO Gordon Viere said:
"The allegations of fraud committed by City of Dixon Comptroller Rita Crundwell, some of which she pled guilty to, are extremely serious and present an opportunity for all affected parties to evaluate how they occurred. We believe there was a shared responsibility that resulted in Ms. Crundwell’s fraud continuing undetected, and the right thing to do is reduce the harm experienced by the taxpayers of Dixon and put this matter behind us. Reaching a fair settlement for taxpayers is important to CliftonLarsonAllen."

First - they are not allegations. They are real. $53 million was stolen and Ms. Crundwell went to prison. Second, trying to say there was a shared responsibility that resulted in the fraud going undetected tries to minimize the CPA firm’s responsibility to detect the fraud that occurred. The auditing profession has got to get its act together and begin to find the significant frauds that have brought down major corporations and caused huge losses to government entities.
This was a simple fraud and could have been detected early on if the auditors had simply examined the endorsements on cancelled checks or tried to visit the non-existent capital construction projects that were part of the fraud.
These are basic audit steps and the audit manager admitted they were not done.
This is another black eye for the auditing profession. A profession that is important to the public. It’s time for all auditors to start studying the past frauds that occurred and find the future frauds that will happen.



Friday, August 9, 2013

Dixon Auditors Didn’t Pay Attention to History or Professional Guidance

Please refer to : Send These Auditors Back to School

NOTE: The information in this blog comes from indictments and depositions in the civil trial of the auditors for Dixon Illinois. The case is currently on trial. The final verdict will determine the guilt or innocence of the defendants. I’ve taken factual statements from these documents.
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One of my concerns with the auditing profession (which I’ve been a part of for more than 39 years) is, “Do we pay attention to the past? Do we pay attention to why prior frauds occurred, what was the cause of the frauds, and why did the auditors not detect it?”

Many of the past frauds I’ve studied identified similar mistakes made by the auditors in the Dixon fraud. Too bad the Dixon auditors also didn’t study the past.

Another source of information to aid auditors in areas that need attention is the inspection reports now issued by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB).

In February 2013, the PCAOB issued Release No. 2013-001, its Report On 2007-2010 Inspections Of Domestic Firms That Audit 100 Or Fewer Public Companies.

Some of the areas the PCAOB identified are applicable to the Dixon fraud. These include:
  • A lack of technical competence in a particular audit area;
  • A lack of due professional care, including professional skepticism;
    • Insufficient testing of the completeness and accuracy of source documents;
  • Ineffective or insufficient supervision,
  • Ineffective engagement quality reviews.

The report authors go on to say:

“The consideration of the risk of material misstatement due to fraud is an integral part of the audit under PCAOB standards. PCAOB standards require that the auditor plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements are free of material misstatement, whether caused by error or fraud….
“Inspections staff have identified deficiencies relating to firms' consideration of fraud in a financial statement audit that include firms' failures to: (a) sufficiently test journal entries and other adjustments for evidence of possible material misstatement due to fraud, including assessing the completeness of the listing of journal entries and other adjustments that is [sic] used for testing purposes; (b) consider the risk of material misstatement due to fraud relating to revenue recognition or indicate why revenue recognition would not be considered a fraud risk; (c) make inquiries of the audit committee, management, and others as to their views about the risk of fraud; (d) conduct a brainstorming session by members of the engagement team to discuss fraud risks, (e) obtain an understanding of the issuer's controls over journal entries and other adjustments, and (f) assess the risk of management override of controls.
“Firms should design and perform audit procedures that address the fraud risks, including reassessing risk and adjusting procedures as appropriate during the audit. The auditor should exercise professional skepticism, and conduct the audit engagement with a mindset that recognizes the possibility that a material misstatement due to fraud could be present”

Unfortunately, in the Dixon fraud we had a partner who claims he didn’t know about the concept of professional skepticism.












They also had an audit manager who didn’t think examining a check could help tell if fraud had occurred.



 





Friday, August 2, 2013

Send These Auditors Back to School

Please refer to : Incredibly, Auditors Miss a $53 Million Fraud in Dixon, Illinois

NOTE: The information in this blog comes from indictments and depositions in the civil trial of the auditors for Dixon Illinois. The case is currently on trial. The final verdict will determine the guilt or innocence of the defendants. I’ve taken factual statements from these documents.

Please see: http://davehancox.blogspot.com/2013/07/auditor-independence-and-competence-on.html

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Who Did the Audit?

One of the questions being addressed in the civil trial taking place on the Dixon, Illinois fraud is: who did the audit?

Clifton Larson claims they were only doing compilation work and it was Janis Card and Sam Card that were responsible for the audit. Sam Card claims he only signed off on the audit report and it was Clifton Larson’s responsibility to do the actual audit work.

Mr. Cards statements are supported by billing records showing Clifton Larson billing for audit work. Clifton billed $37,000 in 2012 and Card billed for $7,000 – you can draw your own conclusions as to who did the audit work. 

Here is a response from the deposition of Mr. Card:













Misunderstanding Audit Concepts

The audit manager at Clifton Larson, who was doing the work at Dixon, made the following statements in her deposition:








No wonder the auditors couldn’t find the fraud!

Knowing how to read a check is a fundamental skill for an auditor and it is a way to assess whether a fraud may have occurred or not. 

Years ago, I was examining checks at Utica Psychiatric Center from patient accounts. I noticed large checks supposedly made out to the patients relatives after the patient passed away. In examining the back of the checks, I noticed many of the checks were cashed at the same local bank, by the same teller and that the signature of the endorsers were similar. This discovery ultimately lead us to the business office employee who was stealing from the patient accounts.

Now, let’s look at an actual check the audit manager from Clifton Larson had access to in Dixon, Illinois. Here is a $250,000 check made out to Treasurer – not to any specific treasurer such as Treasurer, State of Illinois.




The back of the check is the real give away! The endorsement shows it is being deposited into the Fifth Third Bank in Dixon, Illinois. 

This particular account number (which was available to the audit manager) was for an account that Rita Crundwell had established as a City account that only she had access to and only she knew about. There were many checks like this.




These checks were supported by phony invoices from the State of Illinois to reimburse the State for capital project expenditures that were a shared city/state responsibility.

So the audit manager had several clues this might be a fraudulent check:
  • A vague payee,
  • An endorsement that doesn’t match the payee,
  • An endorsement that shows it is going to an account in Dixon, Illinois – not the Illinois State Treasurer,
  • And it is a rounded dollar check, as were many of the similar fraudulent checks

Simply examining the checks could have exposed this fraud. It is a basic task auditors should do during the course of an audit.

Examining the Underlying Transaction


In addition to examining the check, it is important for an auditor to actually verify the substance of the underlying transaction – did we get what we paid for? 

But incredibly, the Clifton audit manager believes an invoice is sufficient evidence for an expenditure. If she truly believes this, than no fraud would ever be uncovered by an auditor. Most fraudulent transactions I’ve uncovered were supported by phony documents.

In her deposition, she said:























So the audit manager believes an invoice is sufficient evidence of an expenditure and at no time did anyone go out to physically examine the capital project to see if Dixon got what it paid for.

This simple step would have uncovered the fraud.









Missing Records

In addition, the phony invoices Rita Crundwell created did not have the normal supporting documentation including a corresponding purchase requisition or evidence of proper city approval.[ii]














The Auditors Knew about the Fraudulent Bank Account


Bank confirmations are a standard part of the audit process. The auditor is seeking to determine from an independent source (the bank) what accounts are owned by the entity being audited and what are the balances in the account. Confirmations are not typically part of a compilation process and thus further support the fact that Clifton Larson was doing an audit, since Clifton did the bank confirmation.

In 2010, the Bank disclosed the existence of the fraudulent account Rita Crundwell had established yet the auditors did not act on that information.

























Conclusions

Auditors have a critical role to play in the public accountability process. Understanding the basics of the auditing profession is important for auditors. Unfortunately, for many reasons, the fraud in Dixon, Illinois was never uncovered by the auditors. It would appear from the public record though, the auditors had many opportunities to in fact find the fraud and bring it to an end.

Unfortunately, that didn’t happen.





[i] Card Deposition – October 9, 2012, Page 102, 15:22
[ii]  Page 5 – Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion to Covert filed 1/11/2013